COMPENSATION FORMULAS FOR
COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES
MARSHALL J. BREGER*

I
INTRODUCTION

More than 150 state and federal statutes' allow courts to award attorney fees to
parties substantially prevailing 2 in litigation. Few of these statutes, however,
specify what formula courts ought to use when making fee awards. 3 At present, the
question of how much losers must pay to winners is a matter of judicial construction of statutes which provide only that the fees awarded be "reasonable."' 4 The
absence of standards has resulted in, a lack of uniformity among trial court fee
awards. In an effort to develop standards, courts began to require compensation at
the "prevailing market rate." The Supreme Court has recently endorsed this
5
approach.
This article will first analyze different approaches to compensation rates in
light of various theories of attorney fees. Second, it will review the case law developing the compensation formulas for court awarded fees and will consider the legislative history of statutory fee shifting. Finally, it will explore the meaning of the
prevailing market rate formula and will show that courts using such a formula
commonly misapply market rate analysis and fail to appreciate the need for a
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1. A list of federal statutes is provided in an appendix to Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730, 755 (D.
Colo. 1982). See also Attorney Fee Awards Reporter, which lists statutes in the index of each issue.
2. The term "prevailing party" has become a term of art. By judicial construction, fee awards have
been limited for the most part to prevailing plaintiffs on the grounds that (a) plaintiffs have been chosen to
implement this given congressional policy, and (b) an award to a prevailing plaintiff is generally paid by an
opposing party who has violated federal law (not true of the converse situation of a prevailing defendant).
See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 413 (1978). Absent some success on the merits, a party
is not entitled to a fee award. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3281 (1983). However, when a
plaintiff prevails on some counts, he can recover fees for the work expended on successful claims. Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1976) (establishing $75-per-hour
cap for attorney fee awards in suits against the United States absent court determination of special circumstances justifying higher fee); 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (1976) (attorneys may not collect more than $10 for
representing a claimant before the Veterans' Administration); International Claims Settlement Act, 22
U.S.C. § 1623(0 (1982) (limits compensation to 10% of benefits paid to claimant).
4. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
5. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984).
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determination of reasonableness. While encouragement of litigation through fee
shifting is a policy articulated in present statutes, awards based on the conventional (yet, in the view of this author, erroneous) theory of "prevailing" market
rates may well lead to excessive fees, thus creating incentives for excessive
litigation.
II
JUSTIFICATIONS

FOR COURT AWARDED FEES AND COMPENSATION

FORMULAS

Traditionally, both plaintiffs and defendants in American courts bear their
own civil litigation costs. 6 In contrast to this "American rule," the British legal
system typically indemnifies the winning party, whether it be plaintiff or
defendant. 7 However, common law exceptions to the American rule have long
8
permitted courts to award fees against a losing party that acted in bad faith.
More recently, statutes have been promulgated which permit shifting fees onto
defendants in order to encourage litigation or subsidize public law suits. 9
It is important to distinguish among and analyze the major rationales for
requiring one party in a dispute to pay the fees of another. In brief, there are four
justifications:10 to make a prevailing party whole, to encourage certain types of
litigation, to punish certain types of parties, and to provide financial assistance to
the prevailing party or his attorneys.
A.

The Out-of-Pocket View

In England and some other common law countries, attorney fees are awarded
to ensure that prevailing parties-whether plaintiffs or defendants-are not out-ofpocket for vindicating just legal positions.II Normally, the courts require losers to
pay winners either "necessary and proper" or "reasonable" costs. 12 In either case,
the winning party must pay for nonessential services provided. In determining
costs, courts take account of the client's expenses. Since awards never exceed fees
billed, the central question is what a party was charged by his attorney. In many
cases this is a routine matter. However, when a lawyer takes on a casepro bono, the
6.
7.

See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 248 (1975).
See generally, WALKER & WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM, ch. 20 (5th ed. 1980), and Good-

hart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 852 (1929).
8. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at 258-9, and Newman v. Piggie Park
Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968).
9. See supra, note 1.
10. Rowe has made use of a somewhat different six-part classification of rationales which he sees as
reflecting "three major strains-equity, litigant incentives and externalities." Rowe, The Legal Theory of
Attorney Fee Shti/zig. A Cntical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 652-53.
11. See WALKER & WALKER, supra note 7. See also Rowe, supra note 10, at 653-57 for arguments
against such a "two-way" fee shifting rule.
12. Where the court awards costs "as between party and party," "[t]he taxing officer disallows any
expenses not strictly necessary and proper to establish the party's case or defense." Where costs are taxed
on a "common fund" basis, as is the case where a litigant's expenses are paid out of a legal aid fund, all
reasonable expenses are recoverable. A. KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM, 271-72 (5th ed. 1973).
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party represented has had no actual expenses. Strictly construed, the out-of-pocket
rationale would prohibit compensation in such cases.
In the United States, public interest law firms or legal services programs that
do not charge their clients would not be able to make a fee request under this
rationale. On the other hand, if we were to adopt the view that many attorneys
instigate public interest lawsuits on behalf of nominal clients, we could reimburse
the cost of such representation even though the client was charged no fee. This
raises the question of how to measure "actual cost" where no fee is set. As an
employee of a legal aid program, a legal aid attorney is paid on the same basis as
in-house counsel, that is, he receives a fixed salary. Thus, it could be argued, both
in-house counsel and members of public interest law firms should be compensated
for the hourly equivalent of their salary plus an allocation for overhead. With
such a structure, counsel who take on a case gratis could be indemnified even
utilizing the out-of-pocket view.
In short, when the market between attorneys and their clients cannot give us
an actual cost figure, we may look to a substitute market, viz., that existing
between attorneys and their employers, for assistance in determining a reasonable
fee.
B.

The Encouragement Approach

In contrast to the typical indemnification of winning parties typically resulting
from the English rule, fee shifting under the American rule requires a judicial or
statutory exception.i 3 Numerous federal and state statutes provide such exceptions,' 4 most often out of a desire to encourage specific types of litigation. The
"encouragement" approach is premised on the view that particular types of litigation will not be brought without some form of subsidy (government or otherwise)
to plaintiffs.i 5 This alleged "market failure" is corrected by statutes providing for
court awarded fees designed to attract plaintiffs (or attorneys) to such litigation.
Generally, those who adopt this approach accept the sociological premise that
many lawsuits are attorney-generated rather than client-generated, as well as the
economic premise that attorneys will always seek income maximization. This perspective views an attorney's opportunity cost, that is, the money which he could
have made had he taken a potentially lucrative case, as the minimum sum that
will encourage him to take a less attractive case which we as a society might wish
him to bring. 16
13.

See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975).

14.

See supra, note 1.

15. If encouragement of certain types of lawsuits is for the public good, it is not clear why the subsidy
should come from litigants rather than from the state, Rowe's suggestion that it would be "unfair,
uneconomical and impractical" to externalize the costs of fee shifting recognizes this general concern but
neatly avoids pursuing it. Rowe, supra note 10, at 673. One way to test whether the citizenry sees such
litigation as a "public" good would be to offer Congress the choice between supporting it with public funds
and taxing losers to pay winners.
16. It is sometimes assumed that the encouragement rationale does not apply to legal services and
public interest law organizations. Some commentators argue that those legal services organizations which
exist to provide counsel to the poor and are funded by state and federal governments choose their cases
without reference to the likelihood of fee recovery. Indeed, there is a moral argument against paying fees
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The Punishment Position

Fees are sometimes shifted in order to punish misconduct either in the underlying transaction or in the course of the litigation. There are three justifications for
this: to punish the offender, to provide additional compensation to the injured
party, and to deter further improper use of the courts. 17 As an example of punishment for transaction misconduct, under Georgia law a defendant is liable for the
plaintiffs attorney fees if he breaches a contract in bad faith., Indeed, in many
states, attorney fees are an element of punitive damages.19 The logic here is that
such defendants are in some sense "bad" men who should be financially punished
above and beyond compensatory damages. The power to levy such fees has been
recognized as an inherent, equitable power of the federal courts. Thus, no statu20
tory authority is required.
The judicial decision to "punish" party-litigants or their attorneys can result
from inappropriate conduct during the course of the litigation as well. These
abuses include the bringing of meritless lawsuits and the use of harassing or
delaying tactics. Recently, a federal district court ordered not the plaintiff but the
plaintiff's attorney to reimburse expenses incurred in defending a meritless lawsuit. 2' The judge relied on his "inherent" power under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to tax an offending attorney with his opponent's legal
fees. 22 Also, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides for assessment of fees against an attorney
who "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiplies the proceedings. In the same vein,
courts also have the power to award fees to a party who suffers from his opponent's
to state subsidized non-profit legal services providers: Financial considerations are inappropriate when
selecting legal aid cases. The job of legal aid is to provide legal assistance to those who cannot afford to
hire a lawyer without regard to the likelihood of recovering a fee. It should be noted that the Legal
Services Corporation Act generally prohibits legal aid lawyers from accepting cases which generate fees.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b) (1982).
On the other hand, others have argued that since government support and operating revenues are
limited, even legal services organizations "would naturally be constrained to devote their energies to the
kinds of suits in which fee awards are available." San Filippo v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
564 F. Supp. 173, 176-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). See also Shadis v. Beal, 520 F. Supp. 858, 864 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
("In 'rationing' its resources [the state-funded legal services organization] must take into account the likelihood of obtaining attorneys' fees."); Breger, LegalAi/for the Poor.A ConceptualAnalysus, 60 N.C.L. RE\'. 282,
313-328 (1982).
Indeed, many non-profit law firms are aggressively going after attorney fees to meet budget shortfalls.
For example, the Center for Law in the Public Interest, a Los Angeles-based public interest law firm,
received over 1.7 million dollars in fees in the period 1975-1980, more than half its budget. As a result, the
firm had to seek a special exemption from IRS regulations governing qualifications for tax-exempt status.
Too Much Cash Brings Woe to Law Center, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 4, 1980, at 3, col. 1.

17. See generally Mailer, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. R'Ev. 613
(1983).
18. Ga. Code Ann. § 20-1404 (1977).
19. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970).
20. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975).
21. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1984, at B9, col. 3 (discussing suit against Victim Services Agency of New
York City).
22. On shifting fees under Rule 11, compare Driscoll v. Oppenheimer, 500 F. Supp. 174, 175 (N.D. I11.
1980) (federal courts have inherent power under Rule 1 to grant attorney fees as a sanction), with United
States v. Standard Oil of Cal., 603 F.2d 100, 103, n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (Rule 11 provides no authority for
awarding attorney fees against unsuccessful litigant).
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contempt of court, 23 and to one who has been subjected to litigation with a third
24
party due to another's wrongdoing.
D.

The Financial Need of the Recipient Party or His Attorney

Lurking in the background of much fee shifting discussion is the notion that
public interest law firms and legal aid organizations are worthy-of largesse. Following this view, one could award non-profit institutions exceptionally high fees on
the grounds that they serve a useful social function and need additional funds to
balance their budget.2 5 This position may well provide an underlying rationale for
large fee awards often justified on other grounds. However well-intentioned, this
position does violence to any general theory of attorney fees. The moral worth or
desert of plaintiffs attorneys ought not have any relevance to the fee structure a
court applies. It would not be fair to require defendants to support financially a
plaintiff's decision to hire "good guys" as counsel.
III
FEE COMPUTATION CASE LAW

The standard cases regarding fee computation are the two Third Circuit opinions in Lindy Bros. Builders of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Saniory
Corp. 26 and the Fifth Circuit opinion inJohnson v. Georgia Highway Express. 27
The Lindy Court first developed some basic standards for fee awards. It began
by multiplying the attorney's normal billing rate by the number of hours spent on
the litigation. This calculation yielded a "lodestar" fee figure, deemed "the only
reasonably objective basis for valuing an attorney's services."' 28 This figure was
then adjusted with reference to several criteria including the likelihood of success
29
and the quality of the attorney's work.
The Johnson Court borrowed a "laundry list" of criteria from the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility for evaluating 30 on which judges were to base their
fee awards. The Jonhson list incorporated the lodestar elements and elaborated
additional evaluative criteria:
23. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
24. See Comment, Recovery of Attorney Feesfrom Third Party Tortfeasors, 66 CALIF. L. REx. 94 (1978).
25. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (CopelandILL) ("Full fee awards to
public interest law firms help finance their work, both in the instant case, and in others. Indeed, fee awards
. . . may help reduce the subsidies . . . that some of these organizations receive.").

26.

487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy 1); 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lind LI). The D.C. Circuit

followed Lindy in National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also
Groves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 1983); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 920-21 (lst Cir.
1980); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 864

(1975).
27. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). TheJohnson factors were applied in a bankruptcy context in In re
First Colonial Corp. of Am., 544 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977).
28. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 167. The use of the lodestar approach andjohnson factors in each of the twelve
federal circuits is annotated in 39 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 312 (May-June 1984).
29. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 168-69.
30. SeeJohnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. This list is an elaboration of the Model Code's criteria forjudging
the reasonableness of attorney fees generally. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-

106(B) (1980).
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-the time and labor required;
-the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
-the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
-the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case;
-the customary fee for similar work;
-whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
-time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
-the amount involved and the results obtained;
-the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
-the "undesirability" of the case;
-the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
-awards in similar cases. 3'
In a trilogy of opinions, the Copelandv. Marshall case produced arguments both
critical and supportive of the lodestar formula. 32 Copeland concerned a fee award
to Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, a Washington law firm, for representing Departmeht of Labor employees in a Title VII sex discrimination case. In a settlement
agreement, the plaintiffs received $33,000 in back pay. Plaintiffs then requested
payment of their fee "at the law firm's customary hourly rate," amounting to
$206,000. 33 The district court discounted that request by approximately twentytwo percent, awarding the firm $160,000. 3 4 On appeal, a panel of the D.C. Circuit, suggesting the need for stricter fee shifting standards when the United States
is a defendant, remanded the case, providing principles for an alternative fee
award calculation. 35 Thereafter, the panel denied rehearing, but issued a second,
clarifying opinion. 36 Ultimately, the appellate court reinstated the lodestar,
market-based approach in an en banc opinion affirming the district court's original
37
fee award.
In Copeland I, Judge Wilkey rejected the lodestar calculation for a novel
approach-a cost-plus-profit formula-which enjoyed a brief tenure until vacated
by Copeland III The cost-plus-profit approach separates the attorney's fee into
three components: the proportionate salary paid the attorney, the allocable over31. It was suggested in Copeland I, 641 F.2d at 890, that "District court judges ...
have had difficulty applying theJohnson factors. A common, yet understandable fault is for the trial judge to make the
conclusory statement, 'after considering each of the twelve factors inJohnson, I find that a reasonable fee is
X dollars.'" Id
32. See Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Copeland I) (appellate court reversed
district court fee awards and remanded for reconsideration under "novel" standards); Copeland v. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 79 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Copeand!!) (motion for rehearing denied, but
Copeland I clarified); Cope/and II, 641 F.2d at 880 (en banc rehearing where Copeland I standards vacated
and Lindy approach adopted).
33. CopelandIII, 641 F.2d at 887.
34. Id
35. Copeland!, 594 F.2d at 244.
36. Copeland II, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 79.
37. CopelandI , 641 F.2d at 880. The court also noted that in cases in which the firm had received a
court awarded fee in public interest litigation it had traditionally contributed the fee to a public interest
law firm. Id at 883 n.l.
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head costs (including secretarial and paralegal services), and a return of profit to
the firm. 38 Such an analysis is more sophisticated than the lodestar approach
because it requires a court to evaluate the various elements of a fee, rather than
merely to accept a reported billing rate. In contrast to the simple lodestar
approach, the cost-plus-profit standard specifically subjects to scrutiny both the
salary paid each attorney and the overhead and profit margin allowed the firm
before adjustments are made for the complexity of the case, the competence of the
attorneys, the degree of success achieved, etc. In both the lodestar and cost-plus
formulas, courts are called upon to apply the Johnson factors. 39 The difference is in
the determination of the "starting point." Judge Wilkey characterized his innovation as one abandoning the traditional hourly-fee lodestar "in favor of a principle
of reimbursement to a firm for its costs, plus a reasonableand controllable margin for
'40
profit."
CopelandIII rejected this approach for several reasons. First, the court observed
that the test posed considerable administrative difficulties. 4 1 The problems associated with allocation of overhead costs, calculation of costs associated with
"imputed salaries" for firm partners, and determination of a "reasonable" profit
were deemed to raise "the specter of a monumental inquiry on an issue wholly
ancillary to the substance of the lawsuit. ' 42 Second, the court asserted that
focusing on incurred costs rather than on market-based charges, was "fundamen43
tally inconsistent" with the congressional purpose behind statutory fee shifting.
Finally, the court noted that the earlier panel opinions gave no reasons why rates
established by market pressures would in fact differ from those achieved through
44
the cost-plus-profit computation.
However, in New York Associationfor Retarded Children v. Carey, decided last year,
the Second Circuit found that a cost-plus analysis would indeed yield rates different from a market analysis where non-profit attorneys are concerned. 45 In
Carev, the court was addressing the appropriate fee award standard for non-profit
attorneys under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976.46 The legislative history of that Act did not clearly indicate how the drafters would figure fee
awards. It simply called upon courts to award fees "adequate to attract competent
' 47
counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys.
38. Copeland!, 594 F.2d at 251-52.
39. See id.at 244.
40.
d at 251 (emphasis added).
41. CopelandIII, 641 F.2d at 896-97.
42. Id at 896.
43. Id at 897. The court stated that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), made clear that a market rate was to be used. Ad
44. Id at 898. See National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) for a detailed elaboration of documentation requirements imposed on fee applicants recovering
under the CopelandIII approach.
45. 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Rahmey v. Blum, 95 A.D.2d 294, 466 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1983),
where the court used a marginal cost analysis very similar to that in Carey.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
47. S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1976). See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong. 2d
Sess. 9 (1976); Comment, Calculationof a Reasonable Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Attorneys' Fees Award Act
of 1976, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 331 (1980).
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The court, referring favorably to Judge Wilkey's cost-plus approach, found
that an award of fees "to nonprofit lawyers based upon billing rates charged by
profit-making lawyers inevitably produces a windfall." '48 This is because the salary
and overhead components of a private firm's billing rate generally reflect greater
expenses than those incurred by non-profit organizations and because the very
notion of a "profit" component for a non-profit firm raises questions of reasonableness. 49 While the court noted that a cost-plus formula would eliminate any windfall aspect of a fee, it declined to require such an approach in light of
administrative difficulties and judicial precedents which frowned upon disparate
treatment of profit-making and non-profit attorneys. Instead, the court permitted
payment to non-profit attorneys based on the rates charged by comparably skilled
attorneys in private practice-with one caveat: The court called upon district
judges to familiarize themselves with the customary billing rates in their communities so that they could set a "break point" hourly-rate figure which would represent
a fee for non-profit organizations short of a windfall.50 Beyond this figure, fees
would be deemed to incorporate the higher overhead costs and profit component
associated with profit-making firms.
The most recent and authoritative opinion on the subject of fee computation is
the Supreme Court's decision in Blum v. Stenson, decided only last March. 5 1 There,
the Court found the language of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act and
its statutory history to require calculation of reasonable fees "according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. '5 2 The Court rejected arguments
that market rates provide excessive fees to non-profit legal services organizations
and that a cost-based standard should therefore be applied to their fee requests.
The Court focused on the three district court cases which were cited in the
legislative history of the Act as applying correct fee shifting standards. 53 Since the
fee awards in those cases were based on customary billing rates, the Court drew the
conclusion that Congress approved of the prevailing market rate approach. The
Court did not take special note of Congress's further statement that "[t]hese cases
have resulted in fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do
not produce windfalls to allorneys.
The Court did not read this statement to require
courts to scrutinize billing rates for windfalls to particular attorneys. Instead,
without analysis, it assumed that prevailing rates are reasonable, advising that
"[t]he policy arguments advanced in favor of a cost-based standard should be
'55
addressed to Congress rather than to this Court.
"-54

48. Carey, 711 F.2d at 1150 (emphasis added).
49. Id
50. Id at 1151.
51. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
52. Id at 1547.
53. The cases were Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974); and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ.,
66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
54. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. at 1546 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-1011 (1970) (emphasis added)).
55. Id. at 1547.
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IV
COMPENSATION FORMULAS, FEE-SHIFTING RATIONALES, AND THE
MARKET FOR ATTORNEYS

The Supreme Court pointed out in Blum that the factors which affect fees in
56
the market are too complex to replicate in the non-market fee shifting situation.
Billing rates vary widely depending on the attorney's length of experience, ability,
and status (i.e., whether he or she is an associate, partner, or "of counsel"). Not
only is a partner's time worth more due to his greater experience and prestige, but
the overhead attributable to him is likely to be far above that of an associate:
Partners' larger, deluxe offices and additional support staff add to their overhead.
Equally important, fees paid by a client are seldom billed at a flat rate. While
firms may have a "public" billing rate for each attorney, the final bill is often
adjusted, taking into account such things as the success of the representation, the
quality of the work, the likelihood of future business from the client, and the
ability of the client to pay. 57
In lieu of going into all these factors in determining each fee request, a possibly
Herculean task, the courts have taken two different approaches. The lodestar
approach abstracts from all the complexity and variety in market-based attorney
fees and instead adopts a general "bright-line" figure based on public billing rates.
The cost-plus approach, in contrast, looks closely at the actual costs incurred by
the particular provider of legal services. Both methods obscure what are potentially the most difficult problems of fee calculation, the former by ignoring particularities, the latter by focusing on them.
The two approaches also differ in their reflection of the four rationales for fee
shifting discussed above. The cost-plus approach adopts a variant of the out-ofpocket view, making it possible to exclude "luxury" elements from the fee award. 58
Rather than basing compensation on opportunity costs, fees can be based on
expenses incurred plus a reasonable profit. Overhead costs geared to the needs
and desires of corporate clients can be adjusted downward when pro bono work is
undertaken. Similar downward revision can be taken with respect to attorney salaries and profit margins if the prestige of the firm and its typical clientele result in
an inflated fee structure. This resembles the English view of fee shifting. A party
whose expenses are to be paid by its adversary can recover all "necessary and
59
proper" costs, but must be prepared to pay for non-essential services.
The cost-plus formula also incorporates the encouragement rationale insofar as
it deems compensation for costs plus a reasonable profit sufficient to encourage
competent attorneys to take socially desired cases. Though such a fee would not
equal the opportunity costs of the most highly paid corporate attorneys, it would
not ultimately require any financial sacrifice on their part and hence should not
discourage them from taking such cases pro bono publico. This is in keeping with
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 1547 n. 11. See further discussion tfra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
See Cope/and l, 20 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) at 82-83.
See supra pp. 250-51.

59.

See supra note 12 and WALKER & WALKER, supra note 7, at 364.
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the encouragement rationale, the intent of which is to overcome the discouragement which results from unreasonably low fees.
In contrast, the "market rate" approach often promotes litigation through
unreasonably high fees. Indeed, this approach, including the lodestar method,
appears designed to subsidize public interest litigation and to punish "bad"
defendants. It often will provide non-profit attorneys a greater award than will
the cost-plus formula, especially when such billing rates are at the higher end of
the market. 60 Where the losing party is worthy of punishment or has a deep
pocket, this may not be offensive. However, the higher award will have no logical
connection to the appropriate degree of punishment 61 and will, at best, have
retributive and redistributive effects.
Though the punishment and financial need rationales could thus be argued to
justify the lodestar approach, attorney fees have traditionally been used to punish
misconduct only when there is statutory authority for punitive damages or when
federal courts exercise their equitable power. There is nothing in the legislative
history of the most often utilized fee shifting statutes to suggest that Congress saw
all losing parties to be worthy of "punishment" through the awarding of exceptional fees. On the contrary, Congress has mandated that "reasonable fees" be
awarded. 62 We cannot assume that awards which indiscriminately reflect the
billing rates of opposing counsel will in all cases be "reasonable. ' 63 Should the
purpose of this wealth-shifting be assistance to public interest attorneys, surely the
preferable response is direct government subsidy through, for example, Legal Services Corporation grants. Requiring losers to pay going rates to all winners' attorneys not only puts the burden of subsidy on a relatively small sector of society, but
subsidizes public interest and profit-making law firms alike.
If, then, both congressional intent and common sense favor an encouragement
approach, in what ways can courts determine how much encouragement is needed
to secure attorneys for lawsuits in the congressionally favored litigation categories?
Encouragement is the product of both risk and reward. That is to say, in measuring encouragement, the level of any award must be discounted by the likelihood of securing it.64 The more certain and potentially greater the recovery, the
more likely an attorney is to devote his efforts to the lawsuit. Conversely, holding
the amount of the potential fee award constant, a low probability of success will
make an attorney less likely to accept a case.
This relationship has led many judges to award multiple fees or contingency
60. See New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d at 1151 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussed supra p. 255).
61. See Rowe, supra note 10, at 661.
62. See Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C § 1988 (1980); Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
63. See Note, Uniform Securities Act: Award and Determination of Attorneys' Fees, 35 S.C.L. Rev.
23, 26 (1983) ("While the . . . provisions allowing successful plaintiffs to recover costs and fees have a
punitive effect, the defendant's punishment should not be determined by the opposing counsel's hourly
market rate.")
64. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees.- What is "Reasonable?'" 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 324-25
(1977).
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bonuses when a particularly complex or novel case is won. 6 5 The intent is to
66
encourage such litigation by increasing the reward to compensate for the risk.
There are two problems with this approach, however. First, a discretionary bonus,
coming upon successful completion of the case, cannot serve as an encouragement
to take a case. Rather, it is an encouragement to do a good job once a case has
already been accepted. The decision to accept a case more likely depends on the
attorney's assessment of its merits, his interest in it, and the state of his calendar.
Furthermore, once an attorney takes on the case, he is bound by professional ethics
to provide competent and diligent representation. 6 7 If extraordinary efforts are
expended and unexpected successes are achieved as a result, then a bonus for
exceptional service may be in order. 68 However, as such rewards do not compensate for the original riskiness of the case, they cannot function as encouragement to
take cases.
The second problem with encouragement bonuses is that the higher the rate is,
the more likely fee shifting will not simply replicate the rate which would prevent
attorneys from turning down meritorious cases because of economic need, but
rather will skew the legal market in favor of bringing certain categories of lawsuits,
regardless of their merits. Higher-than-market rates wil certainly encourage litigation in a particular area, but the potential reward may be so high as to overcompensate for the riskiness of a suit with little merit. 69 In addition, such overpayment
65. See Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (fee tripled because of "unusual risk or
contingency factor involved"); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards,, 90 YALE L.J. 473,
473 n.l (1981). But cf Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1548 (1984) (district court award of 50% bonus
reversed: "The novelty and complexity of the issues presumably were fully reflected in the number of
billable hours recorded by counsel . . .").
66. The corollary that simple or certain litigation should earn a lower fee may or may not follow.
Compare Rowe, supra note 10, at 669 ("[W]hen a civil rights plaintiff has a strong substantial damage claim
that makes no significant contribution to precedent, he needs little or no extra encouragement to bring his
claim and may not qualify for a fee award."), with Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978)
(district court cannot reduce fee award to successful plaintiffs because of the simplicity of the case).
67. See American Bar Ass'n, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rules 1.1, 1.3 (1983);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979).
68. See Blum, 104 S. Ct. at 1550.
69. Economic analysis elucidates how fee shifting affects the frequency of litigation. There are three
principal articles applying economic analysis to fee shifting issues: Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure andJudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial. A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Priest,
Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation. An Economic Analyss, I SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 163 (1982). The
approach of these articles derives from Landes, An Economic Analysts of the Courts, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 61
(1971).
Present fee award statutes are generally considered to incorporate what economists call a "favored
plaintiffs" rule because they are typically applied in the case of successful plaintiffs. Such a rule will affect
both the comparative position of plaintiffs and defendants and the frequency of litigation. As its name
suggests, the favored plaintiffs rule enhances the position of the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
Priest, supra. Under such a rule, plaintiffs will be encouraged to sue whenever they believe their suit is
meritorious.
However, there is no reason to assume only meritorious actions will be encouraged. Incentives provided
by statutory fee awards which operate only in favor of plaintiffs will likely enhance the attractiveness of
suits which are less meritorious. When plaintiffs lose, they are not charged for the costs incurred in
defending against their invalid claims. Particularly where public interest attorneys provide free representation, such a rule has an indiscriminately encouraging effect on plaintiffs. Furthermore, the shifting of
attorney fees will increase the frequency of litigation. This is because the higher the expected value of a
suit, determined by the combination of the probability of success and the amount at stake in the case, the
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to attorneys when they prevail effectively subsidizes lawsuits on which they do not
prevail. This is contrary to the intent of Congress which has specified that only
"prevailing parties are to recover fees." ' 70
Others who are concerned that potential plaintiffs may be dissuaded from litigating have utilized liberal "market rates" in awarding fees. 7 1 These judges perhaps seek to encourage litigation by compensating attorneys for their "opportunity
cost." A problem arises here, however, when these judges mistake an attorney's
public billing rate for his opportunity cost. The mere fact that an attorney has a
schedule of billing rates does not mean that he receives those rates at all times and
from all clients. He may actually charge each client what the underlying market
72
can bear, using his public rates as a negotiating tool.
Furthermore, even when attorneys establish their public billing rates, courts
have been known to reject such clear market evidence in order to award higher
fees. For example, Laffey v. Northwest Airhines73 was a class action Title VII suit
brought by female flight attendants. The plaintiffs were represented by a law firm
whose clientele consisted primarily of labor unions. The firm regularly charged its
clients $60-100 per hour. While aware of the firm's actual fee structure, the court
awarded them $75-175 per hour. These fees were "higher than any hourly rate at
which [the firm's] counsel ha[d] ever billed its regular fee-paying clients."'7 4 The
court deemed the law firm's actual rates to be "discounted" in an effort to accomodate their non-profit clients.
The court argued that $60-100 per hour did not reflect the "true value of the
services rendered" because other firms doing similar anti-discrimination work
commanded higher rates. The court assumed that the $75-175 range constituted
the "prevailing market rate" for Title VII attorneys because some of the larger
corporate law firms which took such cases commanded these fees. The court further assumed that the market is the same whether the case is taken by labor union
law firms, public interest attorneys, or large corporate firms.
The Laf.y court seems to have misunderstood the concept of opportunity cost.
In order to compensate accurately for opportunity costs, a court would have to
determine what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the services rendered. This is a far more complex endeavor than simply multiplying the number
more likely the favored plaintiffs' rule will increase rather than decrease the frequency of litigation because
it increases the amount at stake between the parties. Id at 166.
70. See supra note 25, and Rose, Jones & Kelly, Reform of Civl Rights Fee Award PracticesNeeded in Legal
Times 13 (February 13, 1984). The authors also point out that bonuses may have the effect of penalizing
the least blameworthy defendants since complex and novel cases, where bonuses are most common, often
present very close questions. This point is not lost on courts which follow the English Rule. For example,
in Canada, where losing parties typically pay the winner's attorney fees, an exception is made when a new
point of law is at issue in the case. In that situation, fees are often not shifted. See P. Lantz, Costs as a
Regulatory Device, 2 Advocates' Q. 396, 417 (1981).
71. See Berger, supra note 64, at 322-23 and n.164.
72. See How Firms Bill, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 27, 1984, at 25-36 for discussion of a variety of billing practices
including volume discounts, contingency fees for defense representation, flat fees, and "multiple" rates,
which vary according to the identity of the client.
73. 572 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, 572 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
74. Laffq, 572 F.2d at 372.
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of hours worked times a supposed "prevailing market rate." As Judge Wilkey has
observed, where profit-making corporate law firms take on a Title VII civil rights
case pro bono,
[tihere is missing an a priori pecuniary relation between the legal services undertaken and
the willingness of any beneficiary to pay for them. Therefore, charging a losing defendant
for the prevailing party's legal expenses at "market" rates which no one would ever
have
75
voluntarily assumed is to destroy the market concept by purporting to respect it.

As noted above, Copeland III had rejected the cost-plus approach of CopelandI
and Copeland !! in part on the grounds of administrative difficulty. However, the
need to determine a true market rate for different types of litigation in different
locales is equally, if not more, difficult. First, delimiting the relevant market is a
complex matter. This results from having to fix relevant market factors and to
quantify them for purposes of analysis. The major area of the law in which a
definition of market has been attempted is the field of antitrust. To define a
market under current antitrust analysis, "one must decide the geographic dimension, the product dimension (what products are close enough substitutes to be
included in the same market), and the production dimension (what products are or
can be manufactured with the same production facilities). ' 76 These factors suggest a number of analogous inquiries which may be posed.
As to the "geographic" dimension, one might be tempted to view the provision
of legal services as part of a national market. Certainly the billing rates in New
York differ markedly from those in Indianapolis. Examination of the "product"
dimension also suggests a host of questions. Are the attributes of civil rights litigation and corporate litigation sufficiently similar to justify equivalent market rates?
Would a corporate client view an experienced civil rights attorney as a substitute
for counsel in corporate litigation? With regard to the production dimension, does
the fact that corporate and civil rights legal services can be provided by the same
attorney indicate a single market? Or should they be treated as potential entrants
75. Copeand!!!, 641 F.2d at 914 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
76. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 517 (1978).
An examination of the "product" dimension in turn calls for "an appraisal of the 'cross-elasticity' of
demand" to determine whether "commodities [are] reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
purposes." United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-95 (1956). Reasonable
interchangeability involves three components: price, use, and quality. These factors, as applied, focus on
the consumer's perceptions.
In applying the quality test to the legal market, the question posed would be whether the attributes of
welfare litigation and corporate litigation are sufficiently similar. Id at 397. Certainly, both may be complex. But even if the inquiry as to similar attributes were to end there, there is only one factor favoring a
finding that welfare law and corporate law are one market. Application of the second and third components points to considering the two areas of practice as two distinct markets.
The use test is a question of functional interchangeability. Id at 399. In this regard, it is doubtful
whether many corporate clients would be comfortable substituting a welfare attorney as counsel in corporate litigation. Under the price test, "[i]f a slight decrease in the price of [one product] causes a considerable number of customers of [another] to switch ...,it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity
of demand exists between them .... ." Id. at 400. It is again doubtful whether any reduction in fees
charged by a welfare attorney could cause corporate clients to hand over their business.
This thumbnail sketch only demonstrates the lack of refined analysis by courts which subscribe to a
uniform market rate. Although a comparison of the market compensation formula for public interest
litigation with the market inquiry posed by antitrust law can be faulted as comparing apples and oranges,
it is, nonetheless, useful in emphasizing the limits of a simplistic analysis-that welfare law and corporate
law are a single market simply because both involve the practice of complex law.
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to the same market? Would the necessary adjustment on the part of the attorney
be minor or major? What additional elements of time, cost, and education would
be required in a change in the type of practice? That these questions have not
been addressed, much less answered, demonstrates the lack of serious market analysis by courts that subscribe to a uniform market rate.
Second, once a market is delineated it is no simple matter to determine the rate
which supposedly "prevails" in that market. This issue, with which courts regularly grapple, has numerous facets. A basic problem is that the public possesses
little accurate information concerning fees charged by law firms. In some
instances, such as bankruptcy fees, fee awards approved or ordered by a court
necessarily become part of the public record. But more generally, the factual data
regarding fees have remained the proprietary information of law firms, which
guard this information closely.77
Thus, courts typically rely on approximations of the market rate in ordering fee
awards. In most instances, attorneys submit affidavits as to fees they charge in
cases of analogous complexity. 78 For example, an NAACP Legal Defense Fund
attorney might proffer an affidavit to the court describing fee awards he received
in Title VII cases. Such an affidavit would then be used as evidence of the
"market rate" for that attorney. The danger here is that affidavits may become
boilerplate, the court accepting statements about prior fees without a rigorous
review process. There is nothing to guarantee that earlier awards were based on
satisfactory analysis. Although some courts have determined that evidentiary
hearings are not required where there is no controversy over fee claims which are
fully substantiated, 79 evidentiary hearings to review affidavits are often held. 0
Where required, such hearings constitute an additional complexity in the determination of market-based fees. Furthermore, attorneys rarely admit to discounting
of fees or partial fee collection. Rather, in such circumstances one tends to claim
one's top fee whether or not one receives it all the time.
Courts must also deal with the problem of overcompensated time. Not only
have courts recognized the need to reduce hourly rates for such non-attorney personnel as secretaries, paralegals, and law students, 8 1 they also must distinguish
77. Indeed, one of the frequent complaints about Copeland I was that the cost-plus-profit approach
would lead to an opening of the books of major Washington law firms. Royce Lamberth, an Assistant U.S.
Attorney in the District of Columbia, has attempted to secure, by subpoena, the files of the D.C. Bar's
Lawyer Referral and Information Service List where many lawyers who handle employment discrimination suits have listed their fees. Lamberth contends that this information will provide "true" fees charged in
Title VII cases. Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1983, at D2, col. 1. The D.C. Bar has resisted this effort. In a
recent Title VII case, Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), Chief Judge Robinson
opened the record on affidavits submitted by D.C. law firms to support plaintiff attorneys' claim as to the
market rate for Title VII cases. See What a D.C Hour is Worth: Who Charges What?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 15, 1983,
at 2, col.4.
78. See Berger, supra note 64, at 321 & n.161.
79. See King v. McCord, 621 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir. 1980);in re First Colonia Corp. of Am., 544 F.2d
1291, 1300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 473 F. Supp.
1017, 1021 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
80. See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 652 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1981); Lipscomb v. Wise, 643 F.2d
319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Farris v. Cox,
508 F. Supp. 222, 227 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
81. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 473 (2d Cir. 1974); Ross v. Saltmarsh, 521
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between attorney hours billed for legal work and attorney hours billed for work
that could (and would) otherwise have been done by a paralegal or research
82
assistant.
Another difficult situation arises where a law professor is a public interest litigator on the side. A professor can neither provide an hourly salary figure, since his
only commitment is to teach a certain number of courses, nor compute overhead
costs, because his office and support staff are provided by the university. Ostensibly, then, the value of a law professor's marginal time is whatever amount others
are prepared to pay for it. This inherent lack of precision makes it difficult for
83
courts to evaluate professorial fee requests.
In reaction to the many complexities faced in determining precise market
rates,8 4 suggestions have been made for approximating fees in a different manner.
In situations where the government is the defendant, for example, it has been proposed that courts award plaintiffs' attorneys the same amount the government
F. Supp. 753, 762-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1054, 1055-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd, 578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1978). In some cases courts have distinguished between incourt and out-of-court time. See, e.g., Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175, 180 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. demed,
445 U.S. 919 (1980); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 756 (5th Cir. 1977); Dunten v. Kilber, 518 F. Supp.
1146, 1152 & n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Langdon v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 512 F. Supp. 1131, 1139
(N.D. Miss. 1981).
82. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974); Dunsten v.
Kibler, 518 F.Supp. 1146, 1152 & n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Cf Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 4
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (improper to charge partner's hourly rate for work capable of performance by junior
associate).
83. For example, Harvard law professor Lawrence Tribe has recently requested over $400 per hour
for his successful challenge to a Massachusetts law entitling schools and churches to veto city liquor license
grants to nearby establishments. See Massachusetts Battles Lawyers over $332,41 ghts Fee Case, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 14, 1983, at A22. Tribe is renowned for his expertise in constitutional law and is in great demand as a
litigator in particularly difficult cases. Nonetheless, when one's income need not be shared with a partnership nor applied to overhead, it is difficult to comprehend the logic of charging hourly fees "commensurate" with those of a large law firm.
84. Courts also face difficulties in determining fees awardable to pro se litigants. The "market"
cannot really help here. Rather, the question of how to treat pro se litigants for fee award purposes is an
issue the resolution of which depends on one's view of the purposes of statutory fee awards. Courts have
divided on this issued both for pro se litigants in general,compare Turman v. Tuttle, 711 F.2d 148 (19th Cir.
1983) (pro se layman in § 1983 suit denied attorney fee award) and Barratt v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d
1087 (5th Cir. 1981) (pro se layman denied fee award in Privacy Act suit) with Cox v. Department of
Justice, 601 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (pro se layman in FOIA suit may be entitled to fee award), and for
attorneys proceeding pro se. Compare Cazalas v. Department of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1983) (fee
award to pro se attorney in FOIA and Privacy Act suit) and Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (fee award to pro se attorney in FOIA suit) with Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 714 F.2d 646 (6th
Cir. 1983) (fee award denied pro se attorney in FOIA suit) and White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614
F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1980) (fee award denied pro se attorney in Truth in Lending Act suit).
Non-attorney pro se litigants do not incur typical attorney expenses in bringing lawsuits, so any decision to allow them a fee equivalent must be based on either the encouragement or the punishment theory.
An out-of- pocket rationale could also apply, however, if a fee award were viewed as reimbursement for
opportunity costs of the pro se litigant. Such opportunity costs might be difficult to quantify, but at least
one court has suggested that a pro se plaintiff who can show that prosecution of his claim diverted him
from income-producing activity would be entitled to a fee award. Crocker v. United States Dept. of
Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980).
It has been asserted that opportunity costs can more easily be ascertained for attorneys proceeding pro
se, "for the work foregone is of the same nature as that actually performed." Cazalas, 709 F.2d at 1057.
This assumption may not be correct in all cases, however. A court cannot merely assume an attorney
proceeding pro se turned down willing fee-paying clients in order to devote his efforts to the present case.
Inquiry beyond the billing rate is required here, too.
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pays for its legal advice. 85 Generally, government attorneys handle the defense in
suits against the United States. Their cost to the government is a function of their
annual salary and average hours worked, plus proportionate overhead. However,
when in-house attorneys require special assistance, outside counsel may be
retained, and their cost is generally higher. While the Justice Department limits
reimbursement to outside counsel to $75 per hour, other government agencies pay
substantially more, complicating the selection of a single government attorney
rate.
One solution would be to provide a range of "going rates" for government
attorneys based on years of experience.8 6 Another, which has received considerable attention recently, is to establish a "fee cap" based upon a senior government
attorney's salary plus overhead.8 7 The Justice Department's bill on attorney fees,
currently pending in Congress, provides maximum compensation of $75 per hour
to attorneys who successfully sue the government on civil claims. 8 8 The figure is
"commensurate with-but still significantly higher than" compensation of the
government's own senior attorneys and reflects an effort to correlate the fee claims
of plaintiffs' attorneys with the cost of litigation to the government. 8 9 The argument for a cap is that it approximates a "reasonable" fee figure without requiring
analysis of the personal books of attorneys and their law firms. Thus, it provides a
"bright line" figure for fee awards. A cap also presumably reflects some congressional judgment-hopefully informed or studied-as to what the monetary value
of legal work ought to be in suits against the government. It is a statement as to
what a "fair" rate of payment would be, not necessarily a prediction of what the
"market" rate might be. 90 Alternatively, it may simply reflect a disinclination to
85. See Sylvester, OMB's New Assault on Legal Fees, Nat'l. L.J., Nov. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
86. This is the manner in which the Department of Justice determines how much to pay outside
counsel. While paralegal services are compensated at the rate of $30 per hour, attorneys earn from $50 to
$75 per hour, depending on years of practicing experience. See General Accounting Office Report, Justice
Expenditures For Private Counsel and Judicial Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities Cases, GAO/GGD84-2, October 7, 1983, at 5-6.
87. The idea of a fee cap is not new to Congress. A $75 cap is used in fee shifting under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982). See also Model Rules for Implementation of Equal
Access to Justice Act, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,904 (1981).
Also, a two-step cap is currently applied in awarding fees under the Criminal Justice Act. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1982 and Supp. V 1983). Under that Act, attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants
receive fees of $30 per hour for court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time. The Criminal Justice
Act also contains a cap of $1,000 for felony cases and $400 for misdemeanors, id. § 3006A(d)(2), which can
be waived for "extended or complex" representation. Id. § 3006A(d)(3). It is an abuse of discretion for a
trial court to use the Criminal Justice Act rates as a guide when setting fees under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1981). See Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 793 (10th Cir.
1980).
88. See The Legal Fees Equity Act, S. 2802, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The bill also proposes to
double the compensation provided under the Criminal Justice Act to attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants.
89. See 130 CONG. REc. S8498 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Senator Thurmond).
90. Some arguments regarding fair government subsidy have developed in the discussion of fees for a
criminal defense attorney under the Criminal Justice Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 and Supp. V 1983).
An indication of the problem is the recent strike by Washington, D.C. attorneys operating under the Criminal Justice Act, which underscored the claim that fees to attorneys representing indigents, which have not
changed for more than thirteen years, are insufficient to attract competent counsel to criminal defense
work. Note, however, that in the criminal defense context the aim is to ensure fair and quality representation for injured defendants and thus to encourage attorneys to take the time necessary to do a good job, not
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spend more government money for legal assistance.
While a fee cap cannot account for true differences in costs incurred by attorneys, it does provide a baseline for fee determinations. It allows the court to set
fees without utilizing cost accounting techniques. On the other hand, the "cap" is
vulnerable to the criticism that, as a "bright line," it opts for ease of application
over accuracy in reimbursement. 9'
The concept of a "break point billing rate" similarly serves as a bright line, but
is more flexible than a federally-mandated cap. As advocated in Carey, 92 each district judge would be expected to familiarize himself with the range of billing rates
in the community and to select a break point figure beyond which compensation
would be deemed a significant windfall to non-profit attorneys. One could also
make use of the break point concept by determining maximum fees for particular
types of cases. Rather than inquiring into the specifics of each case and the market
relationship of the particular parties, judges would establish maximum rates for
particular services performed by attorneys in their communities. Indeed, the
market itself has developed a similar approach. Paying clients and their firms generally have in mind a certain amount a case should cost regardless of the hours
expended. Bills are adjusted to reflect the reasonable cost of the services rendered
if actual hours spent are not in line with these expectations.
V
REASONABLE FEES AFTER BLUM v. STENSON

In Blum v. Stenson, the Supreme Court held that "reasonable fees" under the
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act meant prevailing market rates. 93 It also
determined that the prevailing rate in any given community would be the same
for private and non-profit counsel. 94 Thus, the Court identified "the market" with
"reasonableness."
In a footnote, however, the Court recognized the doubtful wisdom of such a
view by noting that the concept of a single market for attorney fees abstracts from
reality, and by admitting that constraints which apply to fees in the ordinary
attorney-client context are neither present nor compensated for in court ordered
fee award determinations. 95 In support of the first point, the Court made reference
to the variety of services rendered by attorneys and to the disparity in rates which
results therefrom. Regarding the second point, the Court noted that fees are typically negotiated with clients. Indeed, as the Copeland II court noted, fees are
merely to encourage attorneys to take the case. Even under such circumstances, however, Judge Harold
Greene has said, "Taxpayers should not be expected to pay criminal defense attorneys at the same rate that
General Motors, AT&T and Mobil Oil pay for their own representation." Greene, Be Fairto Lawyers-And
to Defendants, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1983, at A13, col. 2. While Greene supports an increase in the
District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act subsidy, he recognizes that the equivalent of private-sector fees is
not intended.
91. Also, this approach has so far been limited to fee awards in suits against the government. For
other cases, the problems in determining "prevailing market rates" remain.
92. Carey, 711 F.2d at 1151.
93. 104 S. Ct. at 1547.
94. Id
95. Id at 1547 n. ll.
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adjusted in these negotiations in accordance with a number of considerations,
including the benefit achieved, the client's ability to pay, and the likelihood of
future business from the client. 9 6 In contrast, as the Blum Court admitted, awards
under fee shifting statutes are made by the court "in an entirely different setting"
with the fee paid by the losing party.9 7
Although the Supreme Court was aware that the market approach was seriously flawed, it nonetheless deferred to the view of several lower courts and
adopted the simplistic position that "prevailing rates" are ipso facto reasonable.
We are left with the anomaly of an opinion which mandates calculation of reasonable fees "according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community"
while simultaneously warning that
[m]arket prices of commodities and most services are determined by supply and demand.
In this traditional sense there is no such thing as a prevailing market ratefor the service of lawyers in a
particularcommunity. 98

This contradiction is not resolved in the opinion.
Another example of the failure to consider the limits of a market analysis is the
assertion by the CopelandIII court that a fee award of $160,000 to attorneys who
recovered $33,000 for their clients compensated them "for the market value of
services rendered." 99 Clearly none but the wealthiest and most eccentric of clients
would contract for "services" in the market at a price five times their value. This is
not to deny that reasonable persons may assign value to the vindication of principles or the achievement of favorable precedents; it is simply to point out that the
100
This is
market has no mechanism for assigning dollar values to such desires.
contracting
particularly so in the fee shifting context: where the clients who do the
do not pay the bill, the market cannot provide a reasonable fee.
If the intangible costs of discrimination and pollution and the non-monetary
benefits of their abolition could be accounted for by the market, fee shifting statutes would not be necessary to encourage civil rights and environmental litigation.
As is the case in personal injury litigation, contingency fees would sufficiently
encourage private attorneys to represent wronged plaintiffs. Statutory fee awards
were designed precisely to address the inability of the market to produce an
optimal level of litigation in these and other categories. Once this is understood, it
should become clear that the effort to label as "reasonable" whatever the market is
supposed to yield is fundamentally misguided (even if the market analysis used
was not fundamentally flawed).
What, then, is required? Congress has mandated "reasonable fees" determined
in accordance with the standards laid out inJohnson. Those who say reasonable
fees are whatever fees prevail in the market are positivists. Reasonableness
requires more. First, it requires a more accurate determination of the various markets in which different legal services are priced. Second, it requires the imposition
96. Copeland II, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 79.
97. 104 S. Ct. at 1547 n.ll.
98. Id.(Emphasis added).
99. CopelandIII, 641 F.2d at 894. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
100. Even if there were such a mechanism, it would clearly not evaluate the worth of these goals by
reference to billing rates of opposing counsel.
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of objectively derived guidelines upon fees found to exist in particular markets.
While Congress apparently intended the Johnson factors to serve, they clearly do
not provide any predictive guidance.10 '
In sum, reasonableness requires fairness. For example, if an experienced corporate counsel represents a plaintiff in a discrimination case, it is reasonable to
inquire whether it is fair for her to charge either the plaintiff or the defendant for
her expertise in securities litigation. Hiring overqualified counsel at a premium
would seem to be unreasonable. Just as duplicative hours and unnecessarily thorough research are shaved off a bill or fee request, so should charges for additional
education and experience which are unnecessary to the case. The same applies to
premiums paid to obtain counsel with exquisite offices in prime locations. Such
adjustments should precede application of the Johnson factors, for they affect the
base rate which is appropriate to the particular market.
Next, the Johnson guidelines must be reasonably applied. For example, in
determining "the time and labor required," the court should evaluate the reasonableness of the number of hours charged.10 2 This will require an objective rating of
the amount of work different legal tasks should require.
In the absence of such fine-tuning, awards will be excessive. Though public
interest advocates may claim fee awards are too low to provide incentives to take
cases, 0 3 others, including this author, 0 4 have suggested and continue to suggest
that the present fee structure overencourages litigation. The foregoing discussion
has attempted to show how and why this is so.
The crying need in this area is for consistency and objectivity. There are ways
to achieve this goal. The first is to require clearer statutory guidelines regarding
fee awards. This will necessitate Congressional debate over the justifications for
statutory fee shifting.' 0 5 The pending Legal Fees Equity Act provides the setting
for such a debate, 10 6 granting an opportunity to plumb the role of litigation and
litigators in our social fabric.
Where the government is not a party and, therefore, the Legal Fees Equity Act
will not apply, there is no reason why the Judicial Conference cannot recommend
detailed guidelines for judges to follow. 10 7 Nor is there any reason why these
guidelines should not suggest specific monetary figures. In other contexts, market
101. Judge Wilkey, writing of these factors, has said "[t]he imprecision, duplication and contradiction
of these factors is obvious." Copeland!!, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 80 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
102. Determination of the number of hours reasonably billable may depend on judicial views about
the extent to which one has prevailed. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
103. See Steel, Why Attorneys Won't Take Czvi Rights Cases, 236 NATION 362 (Mar. 26, 1983).
104. See Breger, Reducing Lawyers'Fees, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1983, at A23.
105. Cf Blum, 104 S. Ct. at 1547 ("the policy arguments advanced in favor of a cost-based standard
should be addressed to Congress rather than to this Court").
106. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
107. The Judicial Conference is required to conduct a comprehensive survey of the condition of business of United States courts and to submit recommendations to the various courts "to promote uniformity
of management procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business." 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982).
Furthermore, the conference is required to recommend to the Supreme Court such changes and additions to the rules of practice and procedure as may be desirable "to promote simplicity in procedure,
fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay ....
" Id
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prices or wages are determined by administrative agencies through extensive data
collection and analysis. For example, the Labor Department sets "prevailing
wage" rates under the Davis-Bacon Act 108 by means of an elaborate system which
identifies actual contract prices in metropolitan and rural areas throughout the
country. 0 9 The data is examined and compared against Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Although courts cannot undertake this type of administrative task to
determine prevailing attorney fees, other independent bodies certainly could do so.
The Judicial conference might set up a project to collect available data and to
perform detailed analysis aimed at measuring prevailing market rates for particular types of cases in regions throughout the country.
Another approach which would move toward consistency in fee awards would
be to remove the process from the federal judges and assign all fee petitions to a
magistrate. That magistrate would quickly build up expertise about fee claims in
a community. A common law of fees would then develop and attorneys would be
able to determine in advance which claims they could successfully make and how
much is likely to be awarded. This resulting consistency would make it easier for
them to decide whether or not to take a case. Further, this heavy dose of fee
petitions would ensure that the magistrate, in effect a "taxing master" of the English variety, will know better than anyone else the real market for legal services in a
community and could make awards accordingly.ii °
These procedural tools for implementing fee shifting by court award will
operate differently depending on the theoretical justification for fee shifting which
is deemed legitimate by Congress and the courts. These theoretical approaches
ought to be exposed and their ramifications fully discussed. Only by understanding the implications of the system they have wrought can Congress and the
courts hope to improve upon it.

108.
be based
109.
110.

40 U.S.C. § 276(2)(a)
on "prevailing wages"
29 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1.3
See supra note 12 and

(1981) (wages paid to laborers and mechanics on public works projects to
as determined by Secretary of Labor).
(1983).
accompanying text. On taxing masters generally, see Silberman, Masters

and Magtrates, Part I: The Enghh Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070 (1975); Silberman, Masters and M[agstrates, Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1297 (1975).

